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Proving Grounds of Urbicide: Civil and Urban
Perspectives on the Bombing of Capital Cities
Kenneth Hewitt1
Department of Geography and Environmental Studies
Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, ON, Canada
E-mail: khewitt@wlu.ca

Abstract
In the bombing of urban settlements, the main impacts have been on resident
civilians, living space and non-military functions. This is shown in the bombing of
London, Berlin and Tokyo in the Second World War, arguably the first and only
serious tests of strategic air power and urbicide to determine war outcomes. The
history and scope of raiding of these capital cities differed in many ways, but the
civilian experience and urban implications were very similar. The bombings
attacked the most vulnerable areas, where resident populations found themselves
poorly protected at best. The intentions, as well as results, of the raiding are
examples of urbicide, planned to kill indiscriminately and destroy all elements of
urban existence. Yet, a disarticulation emerges between the political, industrial and
war-controlling functions of the capitals, which the bombing was supposed to
disable but could not, and the plight of their citizens. The bombing was encouraged
as ‘spectacular violence’, even though militarily inconclusive and, in seeking to
avoid combat while terrorising non-combatants, it experimented with an approach
to armed violence that would prevail after 1945. Despite enormous changes since
1945, the plight of bombed civilians has changed little.
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Introduction
No state can do without a capital city to serve as the pivot of its
culture...No great nation can long endure without a centre where its
political, intellectual and economic life can be focused, and its people
feel united.
Heinrich von Trietsche (quoted in Willis, 1973, 791)
...the total devastation of the centre of a vast city such as Berlin would
offer incontrovertible proof to all peoples of the power of a modern
bomber force...a long continuing memorial to the effects which
strategical [sic!] bombing had produced in this war and could produce
at any time again.
Directorate of Bomber Operations, U.K. (1944), PRO AIR 20/4831.
Shortly after the first aircraft flew a century ago, air forces were deployed to
bomb cities. Civilian air raid casualties since then have numbered in the millions.
Tens of millions have been made homeless, displaced and otherwise directly
affected by aerial bombardment (Iklé, 1958; Hewitt, 1997). More civilians have
been killed by other forms of armed violence, but counter-city bombing emerged as
the largest threat of destruction for cities, whether compared to other forms of
warfare or to natural and technological disasters (Elliot, 1972; Hewitt, 1983;
Rummel, 1994). Air power, especially as it threatens cities, epitomizes total war
and the so-called balance of (nuclear) terror. It has been the focus of ‘civil defense’
and is a leading instrument of the ‘war on terror’ (Quester, 1966; Ali, 2000).
My focus is on civilians in heavily bombed cities, the consequences of the
destruction of communities and their living space, urban services and cultural
heritage. I look mainly at evidence of whom, what, and where of raid impacts and
civilian responses; a viewpoint from under the bombs, giving priority to the
condition of city-dwellers. This ‘view from below’ contrasts with the commanding
perspectives of air power (Virilio and Der Derian, 1997). The attacks appear much
more like calamities than warfare. They are about terror, not fighting (Graham,
2004). However, it may be wondered what can be learned from attacks 60+ years
ago and, something not seen since, attacks on the capital cities of major powers.
Wars since 1945 appear very different from the Second World War, and there
have been extraordinary innovations in air weapons systems. Recent investigations
of these issues highlight new or emerging urban features and the unique contexts of
recent wars. There are transformations in architecture, telecommunications,
surveillance, counter-insurgency and urban warfare. The talk is of “cybercities”,
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“homeland security”, terrorism and urban geopolitics (Davis, 1998; Graham, 2004).
These concepts address important arenas of contemporary life and compelling
concerns in urban violence. However, they foreground technocratic and strategic
transformations, whether to approve or critique them, especially the roles of those
literally and metaphorically “calling the shots” in cities or at them.
Conversely, the question addressed here is whether any, or much, of these
developments alter the predicament of civilians under the bombs. Rather than
entering some post-modern catastrophic society, badly bombed areas undergo a
sudden devolution, an extreme projection of Graham’s (2004) “forced
demodernisation”. As he emphasises, consumer goods and high-tech options are
less relevant than denial of elementary forms of everyday survival and communion.
A more accurate if appalling picture may be that conveyed by airmen who have
wanted to bomb enemies “back into the Stone Age”, notably General Curtis LeMay
on various occasions (Coffey, 1987). The link with the moral implications and
experimental nature of the raids, discussed below, is expressed in one of the first
and most forthright critiques of the bombing war, “Advance to Barbarism” by
F.J.P. Veale (1962). A main and immediate impact is the loss of homes, another
atrocity identified as “domicide” by Porteous and Smith (2001). It will be shown
that domestic space is almost always ‘ground zero’ in the bombing of settlements.
Equally common are malnutrition, destruction of systems of health care, absent
hygiene, unsafe consumables and medicines; widespread scavenging, having to eat
vermin, trafficking and Black Market economies (Gregory, 2004). Meanwhile,
city-dwellers tend to lack the experience, tools and skills, or permission to pursue
‘Stone Age’ adaptations. In such terms, the urban wastelands and bombed-out
people of east London in 1941, the rubble of working class Berlin in 1943, and
‘dead city’ of downtown Tokyo in 1945, prefigure the essential plight of residents
in Sarajevo, Beirut and Grozny in the 1990s; Baghdad, urban Gaza, Jalalabad,
Tskhinvali and Gori today.
The case for these statements must emerge from world war evidence and
events. However, it involves an important issue of researching the topic. In recent
and on-going conflicts, raid plans and results tend to be kept secret. Evidence is
unreliable and subject to “spin” by interested parties. The same occurred, indeed
was pioneered, during the world war; but afterwards, the release of once-secret
documents has offered detailed and relatively clear evidence of the goals and
impacts of the raids. The bombing threat led governments to watch their own
citizens very closely. House-by-house and street-by-street investigations were
made after most attacks; deaths and injuries were diligently recorded. An
unparalleled record of conditions in the cities survives, including the plight of
ordinary civilian victims in areas that bore the brunt of the attacks. These records
have received much less attention than the air war itself, and mainly in studies of
individual countries or cities (Harrisson, 1976; Havens, 1978; Friedrich, 2002). The
article makes use of some very rich archival sources:
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(i)
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS)
collections in the National Archives in Washington D.C. (MacIsaac,
1976), identified as UBSE (European Surveys) and UBSP (Pacific War
surveys); and
(ii)
U.K. Home Office (HO) files relating to wartime conditions
and Air Ministry (AIR) files on Britain’s prosecution of the bombing
war, in the Public Record Office (PRO), Kew, London.
Documents from these sources are essential to the critical approach adopted here.
They were not compiled with the concerns being addressed but provide strong
support for them. Evidence gathered and confirmed at the time, and how it was
used to pursue war aims, is more fundamental to the argument for urbicide than
later assessments, even if the latter are more accurate. Equally important, items
cited differ markedly from official, wartime pronouncements and most of the air
war literature since. They come from the most neglected parts of the same archives,
but provide detailed records of the extent and nature of civilian casualties, dehousing, etc. They show that these were not just clearly known to raid analysts, but
were central to raid objectives. As such they provide firmer support of existing
critiques of the bombing based largely on inference (Veale, 1962), or second-hand
sources and post-war observations in the cities (Lindqvist, 2000; Grayling, 2006).
The Morality of ‘morale bombing’
An urban, civil perspective cannot ignore ethical and legal implications; civil
society is impossible without them. Broadly, I agree with positions defined by
others who specialise in humanitarian law and “the laws of war”, that the urban
raids violated fundamental principles (Walzer, 1977; Grayling, 2006; Selden,
2008). Even so, the evidence suggests most civilians in bombed cities were neither
pacifists nor anti-military, and backed their own air force. Few thought air war,
even the enemy pilots bombing their city, inherently wrong – only the bombing of
defenceless, uninfluential civilians (Hewitt, 1994a). Therefore, it seems
inappropriate to assume an anti-war or anti-air force approach here, whatever the
merits of such positions.
Recently, counter-city attacks have been called “urbicide”, a word coined by
Bosnian architects during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (Graham, 2004;
Coward, 2004, 165). The term is at least less ugly than the phenomenon it defines,
and situates attacks on cities among other forms of indiscriminate and
reprehensible violence, including genocide (Shaw, 2004; Valentino, 2004). There is
not just destruction; each death and loss contributes to, and is usually intended to
cause, extermination of the larger social body—in this case, the people, support
systems and associations upon which urban/civil life depend. It contravenes the
basic intent, often the letter, of conventions to outlaw attacks on non-combatants.
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The raiding of capital cities emerges as the intentional annihilation of primate
cities, resulting in massive civilian casualties; a process also called “morale
bombing” and, by its victims, “terror bombing”. This is not to say that what
civilians endured in other cities was less severe, or can be treated as somehow less
important. If anything, a stronger conclusion is that civilians in all heavily bombed
cities shared similar predicaments. Equally, post-1945 bombings of cities are not
less, but also not more, painful and urbicidal. They may be very different in
intensity, scale or context. However, world war raid plans did view the capitals as
exemplary, “show cases” in a set of aims, experiments, and consequences definitive
of urbicide (Lindqvist, 2000, 82; Ali, 2000; Herold, 2004).
Experiments and Spectacular Violence
Two other features of the capitals’ story would assume general significance
for urbicide in the post-war world: the practice of “live experiments”, and a related
preoccupation with demonstration pieces or spectacle. Each identifies a mind-set—
military and social assumptions—that continue today. Of course, experimental sites
and models are integral to air war planning. Incendiaries were tested on mock-ups
of “German vernacular architecture” and Japanese urban areas (Standard Oil
Development Co., 1943; Bond, 1946).2 However, the story of the capitals
underscores an experimental element in actual raids. New techniques were
continually being tried out to increase surprise and destructiveness. The A-bomb
victims saw themselves as “guinea pigs”, and are unique in this respect (Lifton,
1967). Nevertheless, conducting live experiments against urban areas applies to the
earliest “blitzes” on British cities, to the V-rocket attacks, RAF “main force” fire
raids on German cities, and USAAF fire raids on Japanese cities.
In air war planning and table talk another preoccupation emerges: making a
statement, teaching lessons to the enemy or, as the quotation above suggests, to “all
peoples”. Documents would refer to a raid as a “big show”. The most destructive
raids, those on the capitals especially, were freighted with notions of exemplary
spectacle.
The ‘society of spectacle’ was an interpretation of modernity developed by a
radical, primarily urban, political movement in the 1960s: the Situationists
(McDonough, 2002). It characterises modern, urban-industrial society as governed
through “... an ever-growing mass of image-objects ... [by which] the ruling order
discourses endlessly upon itself in an uninterrupted monologue of self-praise ...”
Such a “monologue” had appeared in bombing wars long before and served the
same “... abstracted vantage-point of the master-subject ...” (Debord, 1994, 17 and
19). However, the bombers’ spectacles were intended to shape the imagination of
2

AIR 14/763 (Saundby) 19 Jan, 1942; Bottomley, 25 Oct, 41; AIR 52/77; HO 191/194 Research and
Experiments Dept., “Japanese Domestic Architecture” (12 Mar. 1944).
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destruction rather than “production”. They sought to communicate spectacles of
death and ruin, rather than of consumption and commodities, to so-called mass
society. The same is found more recently in “shock and awe”, while the release of
“smart” bombing footage contributes to this sense of dazzling spectacle. It also
continues another enduring theme of air war rhetoric: that high-tech improvements
in weaponry reduce or avoid the supposedly accidental “collateral damage” of
earlier raids. In the Second World War, it was already claimed that the latest
technologies made bombing efficient, precise, and less indiscriminate. The
newsreels, newspapers and war speeches made it seem even more accurate than
today’s smart bombs. As will be seen, it was monstrously inaccurate and
indiscriminate. Meanwhile, today’s smarter weapons kill even more civilians per
ton than those of the world wars, ensuring that civilians remain the majority of
victims (Herold, 2004; Gregory, 2004).
Capital Punishment
Capital cities have had a special relation to the expectations and conduct of
strategic air war. Visions of a capital falling in fire and ruin beneath an enemy air
fleet appeared long before any air force existed (Clarke, 1992). Capitals have been
bombed in most wars involving air power, from the small Italian effort over
Tripoli, Libya, in 1911 to the massive assaults on Baghdad in 1991 and 2003, and
on Belgrade and Grozny in 1999 (Lindqvist, 2001). Only two factors seem to
restrain states: lack of an air force or of aircraft capable of reaching the enemy
capital.
Planning documents from the First and Second World Wars show the
destruction of the enemy’s capital city as a primary goal: to demonstrate the unique
strategic ability to leap over the battlefronts and assail the “nerve centre” of the
enemy. In the First World War there were raids on London and Paris. Some
neighbourhoods suffered appalling civilian casualties, but the raids were deemed
militarily ineffective. However, new technologies and larger bomber fleets were
expected to change that (Warner, 1943; MacIsaac, 1986). Between the world wars,
Londoners received many dire warnings. J.F.C. Fuller (1923, 15) foresaw a fleet of
aircraft reducing the capital “to pandemonium” in half an hour, the government
swept away “in an avalanche of terror.” Liddell Hart (1925, 47), another respected
military theorist, foresaw the collapse of “organisation and central direction” and
“anarchy” as crowds of “maddened ... marauding ... slum dwellers” roamed the
city.
The attacks were rationalised in terms of the concentration of political and
material power. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Old World capitals
generally grew faster than most other cities, inflated by relatively recent
concentrations of political and financial power, by industrialisation and
transportation networks focussed on them. This helps explain how Berlin, after the
unification of Germany (1871), and Tokyo after the Restoration (1868), developed
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so quickly into cities unrivalled in their own countries and rivalling older capitals
abroad. The world wars came at the climax of this metropolitan dominance within
an international system shaped by the Old World imperial powers.
In 1939, dominance appeared in the entire profile of demographic, economic
and political power. Greater London, with more than 8 million inhabitants, was the
most populous city in Europe, perhaps the world. Tokyo itself was smaller, but its
conurbation made it London’s equal. Berlin’s population was about 4.4 million, the
largest city in Germany and principal metropole of Central Europe. Each capital
was its nation’s leading industrial city, distinguished by diversity and some of the
most modern industries. London was the largest port of the empire. Tokyo’s deep
water port, Yokohama, handled a quarter of all overseas trade. The capitals were
the foci of national road and railway networks, air traffic, and the mass media. Yet,
it was mainly bureaucratic centralism and control of communications that
underwrote their ability to shape national destinies. Concerted action of
governments and corporations helped the global influence of metropolitan elites.
There proved to be much illusion about the role of capitals in war, or what
the bombers might do about that. However, a capital seemed to involve great
vulnerability too and, as the second quotation above indicates, a compelling target
for the air arm. Capitals also attracted apocalyptic visions of the collapse of
civilisation and “city-hating”: the backlash of paranoia and disaffection, equally
part of the era of rapid urban growth and centralisation. They found fertile ground
in the mindset of those gearing up to attack the capitals with weapons of mass
devastation.
Towards Urban Apocalypse
In the Second World War aircraft attacked at least twenty-nine capitals
throughout the Old World. In Britain, Germany and Japan the capitals suffered the
heaviest weight of attack and extent of destruction (Table 1). London and Tokyo
had their respective country’s greatest civilian casualties. Some other towns
suffered greater proportionate losses: Hamburg and, possibly, Dresden had more
civilian casualties than Berlin. There is a huge literature on the raiding of London
and Berlin—Tokyo to a smaller extent in English—but little has been written
comparing their stories, least of all the civilian experience (cf. Robert, 1997).
The bomb load directed at Berlin was twice that for the other two capitals
combined, but its casualties were not proportionately larger. Despite fewer raids
and a much smaller weight of bombs, Tokyo had by far the greatest devastation and
civilian deaths.
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Table 1. Comparative summary of the scale and impact of air attacks on
London, Berlin, and Tokyo
Impact data
Raids
All
Large (>50 aircraft)
Other data
Bomb
All (short tons)
Weight
% incendiaries
Civilians
Killed
and
Injured3
Civilians
Bombed
Out

Berlin
241
73

Tokyo
89
25

75,350

16,568

10
Urban area raids (%) ?
Total
29,890

42
48
50,000 (?)

89
68
100,000+

Severe
Light
Building
Destruction
Demolished+ Severe

50,507
88,848
0.4 million

33,230
?
1.7 million

c.1 million
In all
2.9 million

50,000+

125, 775

267,171

?
5 km2

500,765
26 km2

?
70 km2

Homes Lost
Urban Area Razed

London
360
71
2937 V-weapon
30,000

Sources: For London: Titmuss, 1950; OBrien, 1955; Wakefield, 1990; for Berlin: USSBS E, 1945a,
1945c; Hohn, 1991; for Tokyo USSBS P, 1947a and b; Craven and Cate, 1951-53; Edoin, 1987;
Selden, 2007.

London: The First Generation of Ruins.
The “Air Raid Defence League”, which disseminated official views to the
public in the 1930s, portrayed London as the logical target of a “lightning blow”
from Germany (A.R.D.L., 1939, 17). A 1936 planning document concluded that
“London is ... of far greater national importance than Berlin ...” (Webster and
Frankland, 1961 iv, appendix 8). In the event, Germany showed no interest in a
lightning blow. More than a year passed before attacks on the capital began and it
became the foremost target. Nevertheless, half of Britain’s civilian air raid
casualties occurred within Greater London, and 92 percent of rocket or V-weapon
deaths; almost 30,000 killed (Calder, 1969; Hewitt, 1990). The larger fraction of
property destruction occurred there, especially housing.
Londoners’ experience is singled out by concentrated damage and casualties
in the “Big Blitz”, the first major urban assault (Wakefield, 1990). Elizabeth
Bowen (1949) referred to it, ominously enough, as “the first generation of ruins.” It
began with two attacks on 7th September, 1940, dropping more bombs than fell on

3

See text for ranges and uncertainties
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the whole country in the First World War. Some 840 Londoners were killed and
2,350 seriously injured.4 If the pre-war apocalyptic visions were not realised, that
was not obvious in the worst-hit parts. From the docklands and East End boroughs
fear spread across the whole metropolis:
... The first night ... As we came over Westminster Bridge ... the whole
of the left side of London seemed to be alight ... [with] the whole fury
of that conflagration ...Civilians hastened by in twos and threes, hushed
below the stupendous pall of defeat ... (Green, 1943, 176-7).
Henry Green, novelist and volunteer fireman, was not alone in reporting
inexperienced, confused fire-fighting and rescue work. Decades of official
warnings, exhortations to civilians, were nowhere matched by well-planned
readiness. For several days the raiders suffered little interference from aerial
defences. Shelters and assistance to raid victims were quite inadequate. Most of the
bombed-out had to fend for themselves (Titmuss, 1950; O’Brien, 1955).
Virginia Woolf‘s (1988) diary records “the burning houses”, the fear and
wreckage. She tried “... to imagine how one's killed by a bomb ...” – as well she
might! It was 2nd October and some 7,000 civilians had died around her in barely
three weeks. And women formed over half the casualties, although mostly from
poorer East End districts.5 A rich sense of what ordinary civilians had to say of
their experience is found in Harrisson (1976), Hostettler (1990), and Wakefield
(1990). Voices from the capitals are included in an “oral geography” of air war
developed by Hewitt (1994a).
Some dignify this phase as “The Battle of London.” If so, it was a battle “...
of the unknown warriors ... men, women and children ... in the towns and streets
...” (Churchill, 2003, 233). They wielded fire buckets and spades, not guns;
struggled to save their families and neighbourhoods rather than a battlefront; fought
against explosion, fire, lack of sleep, not their attackers. In ten weeks nearly 13,000
were killed, 18,000 seriously injured, and over 300,000 bombed out. The raiding
then shifted to provincial cities but there were few weeks without some raiders over
the capital. London’s worst individual raids came in the spring of 1941.
The German Air Force did not mount another assault as severe as the Big
Blitz, and probably could not have. In hindsight, the war starts to go against
Germany after 1942; an Allied victory was in the cards from 1943. For ordinary
Londoners, however, none of this was obvious. Germany remained the dominant
military power in Europe for three more years. Its airmen seemed able, more or less
at will, to choose a target for raiding. In 1943, raids killed 542 Londoners and

4
5

HO 198/245.
HO 192/245 for East End casualties
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hospitalised 989. Five sharp attacks in February 1944 killed 600 and seriously
injured 1,300 (Calder, 1969).
Only the D-Day landings of June 1944 seemed really to turn the tide; but at
that moment the V-Weapon assaults began (Collier, 1957). London was again a
proving ground for a new form of urbicide. Some 2,420 “Flying Bombs” and 517
V-2 rockets fell within the metropolitan region, almost half of all that landed on
British soil. Roughly ten times more deaths per strike occurred within London than
elsewhere. Such random, automatic warfare, going on day and night against the
civilian population, was uniquely stressful and surreal (Pynchon, 1973).
Berlin: “Reichstrümmerstadt” (Rubble Capital).
Berlin was spared air attacks in the First World War. Early in the Second it
remained near the limit of Britain’s Royal Air Force (RAF) operations and was
ranked behind the Ruhr as a target of economic warfare. Later on, however, it
became the focus of attacks intended to be decisive. City authorities reported 378
air attacks (Table 2). Civilian casualties occurred in 185 of these raids (Hampe and
Beeskow, 1978; Hampe and Mauter, 1982; Demps, 1982). Almost 75,000 tons of
bombs were directed at Berlin, an enormous commitment, although less than a
third actually fell there. The weight carried partly reflects efforts to overcome poor
results with ever-greater saturation and repetition.
Destructive RAF night raids began on 25th-26th August 1940, but for three
years were “ ... of a harassing nature, the object being to maintain fear of attack
over the city and to impose ARP [Air Raid Protection] measures ...” (Webster and
Frankland 1961, 144).6 Notice here a common and extraordinary assumption of this
style of offensive, urbicidal warfare. Somehow, air planners thought that forcing
the enemy to deploy forces in defence of its own cities was a bonus; defending
even its greatest ‘nerve centre’ a waste of resources, rather than using the aircraft
and artillery in distant battlegrounds—no mention being made of the, usually far
greater, cost of the attacking force. The matter may seem different since 1945,
when most air raids have been against cities and countries lacking any aerial
defences.

6
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Table 2. Six monthly totals of raids, civilian casualties and bombed out for
Berlin
Dates
Year

1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945

Months

Raids
Total

Jan – June
July – Dec.
Jan. –June
July - Dec.
Jan – June
July – Dec.
Jan – June
July – Dec.
Jan – June
July – Dec.
Jan – June

33
7
10
2
9
19
31
44
75

Large,
urban
(USAAF)
1
2
5
10
18 + (2)
40 + (4)
56 + (4)

241

203 + (15)

TOTALS

Civilians
Killed*

Bombed
out

222
97
101
2
1,169
6,700
4,108
1,191
4,429

9,867
5,244
4 ,729
88,189
659,428
469,168
66,054
385,074

18,019

1,687.753

* Based on the only detailed record in Hampe and Beeskow (1978), but their numbers are too low
(see text)
Sources: RAF Raids based on Middlebrook and Everitt (1985) and USAAF on USSBS E (1945a)

Not until 1943 could a major offensive be mounted against Berlin.
Thereafter, it suffered a catastrophic demolition. Some reports cite 80,000 Berliners
killed by hostile action. A former chief of German fire services mentions “... at
least 52,000 dead and twice as many severely injured” (Rumpf, 1962, 159-60). The
head of the Civil Defence Police estimated 49,600 (quoted in Hohn 1991, 135).
The only detailed, official register gives 18,019 civilian deaths (Hampe and
Beeskow, 1978), but it seems much too low.
Unlike many other German cities, Berlin’s layout restricted the development
of mass fires. However, a third of the city’s housing was destroyed or badly
damaged, some 40 percent of the 1939 population bombed out (Hohn, 1991, 1345). About 45 percent of public, commercial and industrial buildings were destroyed
(Bond, 1947, chapters 5 and 6). Those serving the civilian population suffered
earlier and more heavily than those directly serving the war effort. Countless
buildings of great historic and architectural interest were destroyed (Beseler and
Gutschow, 1988, vol 1, 135-199).7

7
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The episode of greatest damage, civilian casualties, and displacement began
with RAF Bomber Command’s “Battle of Berlin”, from November 1943 through
March 1944; in effect, Berliners’ “Big Blitz”. Air Marshall Harris assured Mr.
Churchill: “We can wreck Berlin from end to end if the USAAF will come in on it.
It will cost between us 400-500 aircraft. It will cost Germany the war”.8
The commitment was unprecedented, with 32,646 tons of bombs dispatched,
even if only 18 percent fell on Berlin or did what was classed as “effective”
damage.9 In some raids the RAF had severe losses and, in all, some 2,500 airmen
were killed, 1,047 aircraft destroyed and 1,682 damaged (Middlebrook and Everitt,
1985, 488; Terraine, 1988, 557). German air defences also had great losses
(Demps, 1982), reminders of how deadly the raiding could be for air crew in this
war. Partly to deceive the aerial defences, other cities were targeted as part of the
operations (Middlebrook and Everitt, 1985; Friedrich, 2002). On 30th-31st March
Bomber Command attacked Nürnberg and ninety-two aircraft were lost, perhaps
their worst of the war, leading the RAF to halt the offensive.
The official historians thought the Battle of Berlin a military failure (Webster
and Frankland, 1961). Nevertheless, it was an unprecedented calamity for the city,
killing at least 9,000 German civilians and over 600 foreign workers.10 British
Intelligence reported 30 km2 of the built-up area devastated, ten times more than
for London. About 1.2 million people were bombed out and 1.5 million evacuated,
two-thirds of the wartime totals (Hampe and Mauter, 1978).11
There was resistance to ‘area attacks’ by the US command, and to Harris’
proposals for Berlin, which some classed as “terror bombing“ and contrary to
American policy (Craven and Cate, 1948-1953. v.3, 726-7). Yet, a critical shift
occurred in 1944 when the Eighth Air Force began large area attacks on some
cities. Meanwhile, their daylight ‘precision’ raids against Berlin were usually from
above 8,000m altitude to avoid the “murderous German flak”. They employed
“blind bombing” through a cloud cover and problems of inaccuracy were countered
by “... drenching an area with bombs”. Hence, damage was very indiscriminate. In
1945, US raids on Berlin were extremely destructive, causing a third of the area
devastation and housing losses, if a small fraction of casualties. So many people
had already been driven out.

8

AIR 20/842, Minute 3 Nov. 1943
AIR 20/842.
10
AIR 14/838,905; 20/842, 3234.
11
“Bericht über eine Rundreise durch luftkriegsbetroffene Städte ...im Januar/Februar 1944”,
Staatsarchiv Hamburg, states 25% of all housing lost. Speer Docs. 21.5% destroyed; British
Intelligence estimated seriously damaged housing in Berlin at 31%, based on air photographs to
June 1944.
9
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In the end Berlin suffered a dreadful annihilation (Brett-Smith, 1967). A
member of J.K. Galbraith’s U.S.S.B.S. Berlin team, wrote on 19th July, 1945:
... The place is uniquely devastated, not so much quantitatively as
qualitatively. The city is a living corpse - much more than anything I
saw in the West [of Germany]. The impact of the catastrophe on people
seems to be larger ... need, starvation, disruption of the most primitive
processes of life more outspoken ... That Berlin could have functioned
to any appreciable extent in the last months of the war is almost
incredible ...12
U.S. Secretary of State, Harry Hopkins, called Berlin “a modern Carthage” in
reference to the Roman annihilation of that ancient city (Irving, 1989, 290). The
amount of rubble defies belief; some 70 million m3. Eventually, what could not be
salvaged was dumped in great spoil heaps, which are today the largest ‘hills’ in
Berlin. A satirical name was coined for what the capital, the “Reichshauptstadt”,
had become: “Reichstrümmerstadt” or Rubble Capital (Conradt and HeckmannJanz, 1987).
Summary statistics and the final state of London and Berlin can obscure two
aspects of civilian experience. On the one hand, civilians endured many months
when there was little or no raiding. There were years of life amid the rubble; not a
minor inconvenience for domestic survival. Many recalled lack of sleep as their
worst memories; endless problems with disrupted meals, uncomfortable, unsanitary
and crowded air raid shelters (USSBS, 1945c; Harrisson, 1976, 100-121). There
were hundreds of “false alarms” making people apathetic about raid dangers, and
many stopped going to the shelters (Hewitt, 1997, chapter 11). On the other hand,
destruction and death came, overwhelmingly, in a very few catastrophic attacks. It
is appropriate to consider them, before turning to Tokyo.
Disaster Raids
In most attacks, damages tended to be highly localised. Early in the London
Blitz, the physicist J.D. Bernal started an inventory of “disaster incidents.” A
selection from his lists indicates impacts mainly on ‘ordinary’ civilians in their
homes, places of entertainment or air raid shelters (Table 3). The V-weapon strikes
produced many such disaster incidents and some of the worst. A special calamity
was when hospitals were hit; 76 in London with 2,600 beds lost (Titmuss, 1950;
O’Brien, 1955).

12

USBS E(A) 39 b 1.9, unpubl.
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Table 3. Examples of “disaster incidents” recorded in London
Date
1940
9 Sept.

Time

Place

Killed

Injured

Comment

Night

61

-

Raid shelter

10 Sept.

Night

73

50

Rest centre

13 Oct.

Night

154

33

15 Oct.

Night

67

104

20 Oct.
1941
12 Jan

Night

Cadogan House,
Chelsea
St. Hallsville
School,
West Ham
157/161 Stoke
Newington Rd.
Morley College,
Westminster
St. Peter’s Church

86

107

Public shelter under
apartment block
Emergency rest and
feeding centre
Shelter in crypt

111

6

Used as city shelter

13 Feb.

Night

Bank Subway
Station
Hendon, houses

75

445

17 Feb

Night

Pancras Square

77

52

1943
20 Jan.

Day

Lewisham,
Elementary School
Putney

59

67

Most were children

78

210

Dance hall

King’s Rd.,
Chelsea
The Strand
Turk’s Row,
Chelsea
East Barnet
New Cross,
Woolworth’s
Store

72

111

198
124

-

Apartment block, 40
missing
Shopping area
Shopping area

211
160

108

Suburban area
Mostly women and
children

Finsbury

110

123

Farringdon Market

Night

7 Nov.
1944
? May

Night

30 June
3 July

Day
Day

23 Aug.
? Nov.

Day
Day

1945
8 Mar.

Day

Night

Single 2,500 kg
bomb
Single land mine,
surface shelter

Sources: “[J.D.] Bernal’s lists” (PRO/HO 192/7); O’Brien, (1955); Wakefield, (1990).

The “Battle of London,” a relentless attack night after night, appears as a
single crisis, but a few individual attacks dominate losses (Table 4). Almost a
quarter of the Big Blitz death toll came in four night raids. The worst, on 10th-11th
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May, 1941, killed 1,436 civilians. The most destructive attack, on 29th-30th
December, 1940, set 1,500 fires .13 Those in the inner City of London around St
Paul’s Cathedral were fanned by strong winds into uncontrollable mass fires
(Collier, 1957, 272-3), described as “The Second Great Fire of London” (Johnson,
1988). And this raid should be seen in relation to a defining moment in the history
of urbicide—to some, a glorious one (Spaight, 1944). A British Air Staff
Memorandum of 23rd September, 1941, proposed attacks on German civilian
morale by targeting the most densely inhabited areas of cities with incendiaries.14
Huge increases in the scale of attack would follow and ‘successful’ attacks set
catastrophic fires (Bond, 1946; SIPRI, 1975). This did delay Berlin’s final ruin, the
capital being less susceptible to incendiary attack.

Table 4. The worst ‘disaster raids’ on London and Berlin
PLACE
Date
LONDON
7-8/9/40

No.
Bomb Wt
Aircraft Sht. tons.
(IBs)

Civilians
Killed

Civilians Bombed
Sev. inj. Out

570

- (*)

430

1600

8-9/9/40
15-16/9/40
2930/12/40

200
410
136

- (*)
590 (*)
127
(22,068)

412
430
163

747
900
569

19-20/3/41

479

750

1200

16-17/4/41

685

470
(122,292)
890
(151,230)

1180

2230

19-20/4.41

712

1000
(153,096)

1200

1000

13
14

HO 191/86; HO 193/13, 45; HO199/284; 207/45.
AIR 14/763.

(1,000s)

COMMENT
“Black
Saturday”

“”
“2nd Great
Fire of
London.”
Most
destructive
raid
“The
Wednesday”
2,250 fires:
15 hospital,
13 churches
destroyed or
severely
damaged
1,460 fires
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PLACE
Date

No.
Bomb Wt
Aircraft Sht. tons.
(IBs)
10-11/5/41 507
711
(86,173)
BERLIN
1-2/3/43
302
600 (54%)
23-24/8/43 727
1570
(53%)
3-4/8/43
316
999
(40%)
221597
5376
27/11/43
(49%)
16493
1815
17/12/43
(48%)
27-31/1/44 1741
5188
(41%)
15-16/2.44 891
2332
(50%)
21/6/44
876
2843
(26%)
3/2/45
937
2267
(11%)
6/2/45
1112
2886
(44%)
18/3/45
1221
3092
(50%)

355

Civilians
Killed

Civilians Bombed
Sev. inj. Out

COMMENT

1436

1800

2,154 fires

709
899

1825
2127

64,909
103,558

623

1192

39,844

3758

9907

454,056

628

968

30,063

1526

2194

172,390

169

512

60,836

474

756

28,180

2541

1688

119,057

636

389

71,283

336

357

79,785

Sources: On London O’Brien, 1955; PRO/AIR; Wakefield, 1990; on Berlin USSBS E; Hampe and
Mauter, 1982; Middlebrook and Everitt, 1985.

Although raided so often and by large forces, Berlin’s losses were also
concentrated in a few severe attacks (Table 4). The worst civilian losses occurred in
the first of three successive raids between 22nd and 27th November, 1943 (Hampe
and Mauter, 1982). A USAAF attack of 3rd February, 1945, was the most
destructive of the war. Hans-Georg von Studnitz (1965, 281) described this as “the
Apocalypse” finally arriving. “Tempelhof [Airfield] and [railway] Marshalling
Yards” were the designated targets, but it resembled a classic area attack. 15
In relation to today’s discourses on terror, one notes that no single raid on
London or Berlin killed as many civilians as the 11th September, 2001, attack on
New York (“9/11”). There were more casualties in the series of attacks on Berlin

15

USBSE 39 b 1-9.
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between 22nd and 27th November, 1943. In Britain, only one attack killed more
civilians; over 4,000 in Liverpool and Merseyside on 7th-8th April, 1941 (Hewitt,
1997, 302). For all raids, London and Berlin’s deaths were each ten times greater
than in New York on 9/11, and there were more civilian injured and dead in a great
many raids. Meanwhile, at least thirteen single Allied raids on other German cities
caused more than 3,000 deaths (Hewitt, 1993, 33), and at least ten USAAF raids on
Japanese cities (Hewitt, 1987). The defining European disaster raids were on the
thirteen German cities where firestorms were generated (Hewitt, 1993). Dresden is
the best known, but Hamburg 29th-30th July, 1943, is now recognised as the most
devastating. Out of over 45,000 deaths, at least 30,000 were women and children
(Hewitt, 1993, 35).
None of this is intended to diminish the significance of the avoidable and
intentional massacres in New York or anywhere else. From civilian and
humanitarian perspectives, the statistics are not about a competition, but guides to
the scale of atrocity whose essence does not lie in counting or spectacles. It lies in
the irreversible sense of loss when my/your/any child, parent, spouse, sibling,
friend or neighbour suffers unnecessary and horrible death. Just one person’s
feelings of loss and outrage tell us what this is really about. Numbers should not
mask the faces and places of grief; only aid in bearing witness and opposing the
wilful pursuit of such killing.
Tokyo and the “Big Fire” Raid.
Tokyo was out of reach, except for carrier-borne attacks, until the final year
of the war. Annihilation came in a very short time compared to London and Berlin.
Of some ninety recognised air raids, eight caused 99 percent of civilian casualties
and area burnt out (Table 5). However, nothing equalled the night of 9th-10th March,
1945, when the capital was attacked by 334 B-27 bombers or “Superfortresses.”
They were the newest, most advanced and expensive air weapon, and each carried
some 5.5 tons of bombs. Not the largest raid of the war, it was nevertheless a
formidable force; its mission to destroy Tokyo (Craven and Cate, 1948-53, vol. 5;
Caiden, 1960; Edoin, 1987; Hewitt, 1987).
The “aiming point” was the most densely built-up and inhabited Asakusa
District, where raid plans estimated an average of 40,000 persons per square
kilometre, rising to 55,000 in parts. The ratio of “roofed over” to total area was
exceptional: almost 75 percent for Asakusa and far in excess of most Western city
cores. Here too were packed, flimsy structures, highly susceptible to fire; 99
percent were wooden in Asakusa and not less than 96 percent in the surrounding
areas (Sherry, 1987, 100-15).16

16

HO 191/194; AIR 52/143; AIR 52/77; AIR 52/143. For the logic of attacking residential areas
with incendiaries see Janow (1943).
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Table 5. Summary of raids and damages to Tokyo from 27 November, 1944, to
August 7th, 1945, compared with March 9-10 “Big Fire” raid.

ALL
RAIDS
“Big
Fire”

Damaging Raids
All >50 aircraft

Casualties
Dead Wounded

Homeless Buildings
Destroyed
(Partly)

89 28

95,992 70,957

2,861,857 755,717 (10,907)

1

83, 793 40,918

1,008,005 267,183 (1,175)

Source: USSBS P (1947b, 1947d); data were derived from official Japanese reports acquired after
the surrender and widely considered to underestimate casualties in the “Big Fire” (see text)

The bombers carried mainly incendiaries, about 2,000 tons in all, citywrecking and anti-personnel munitions chosen for effect in residential areas. The
New York Times (21 March, 1945) described their action:
... one of the principle instruments of destruction in the fire attacks ...
the M-69 incendiary ... [is a] jellied gasoline bomb ... containing gelgas, a resin-type jelly [also called napalm] ... Cheesecloth impregnated
with flaming jelly is spewed out in all directions over a radius of
twenty-five yards shortly after the bomb strikes. The material burns
fiercely at a heat of about 3,000 degrees F. for eight to ten minutes”
(quoted in Reischauer, 1974, 130).
The lead aircraft were over Tokyo around midnight and came in at low altitude.
With poor defences and good visibility there was a high concentration of bombs. A
rising wind helped generate a vast conflagration described thus by a fire-fighting
expert:
... an extended fire swept over 16 miles (25.7 km) in six hours. Pilots
reported the air was so violent the B-29's turned over completely at
6,000ft [1,820m] and the heat was so intense they had to put on oxygen
masks ...” (Bond, 1946, 181).
Things were considerably worse on the ground (Pacific War Research Society,
1972, 13). Robert Guillian (1947) lived in Tokyo through the war and gave a
detailed account. He describes desperate crowds converging on the great Senso-ji
or Asakusa Kannon Temple, a Seventh Century Buddhist foundation credited with
saving people who took refuge there in the 1923 earthquake and fire (Seidensticker,
1983, 207). On this occasion, however, the temple was destroyed along with those
seeking safety there.
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First Aid posts were destroyed. Rescue units and 300+ fire engines on the
scene early were unable to reach the stricken areas. Bombing continued for three
hours, frustrating escape and rescue by filling the air with fire from canisters of
jellied gasoline. Few raid shelters were adequate to withstand these fires. Many
turned into death traps where thousands died of asphyxiation, carbon monoxide
poisoning or heat stroke, common causes of death in large incendiary raids
(USSBS E, 1945c; USSBS P, 1947)
By mid-morning on the 10th the main fire had burnt itself out, after laying
waste to an area of 41 km2. Official Japanese estimates were 83-84,000 civilian
dead (Edoin, 1987, 106). Later studies suggest a minimum of 100,000 (Selden,
2007), some as many as 200,000 (Daniels, 1975, 129; Salmaggi and Palavisini,
1979, 682)—at least 90 percent of all raid fatalities in the capital, perhaps a fifth for
all raids on Japan. Over 280,000 buildings were destroyed, mostly residential.
Estimates of the bombed-out were from 644,000 to over one million.17 An
enormous evacuation followed.
The calamity far exceeded anything Londoners faced, or Berliners in an
individual raid. The nature of construction, so effective in feeding the fires, meant
almost no vestige of burned neighbourhoods survived. The authorities saw no point
in restoring services, leaving them as empty wastelands.
A passage in the USAAF official history raises some compelling urbicidal issues:
... One broadcast reported that the sea of flames which enclosed the
residential and commercial sections of Tokyo was reminiscent of ...
Tacitus’ famous account of the 64 A.D ... holocaust of Rome, caused
by the Emperor Nero ... But the physical destruction and loss of life at
Tokyo exceeded that [and] any of the other great conflagrations of the
western world – London, 1666 (436 acres, 13,200 buildings); Moscow,
1812 (38,000 buildings) Chicago, 1871 (2,124 acres, 17,450 buildings);
San Francisco, 1906 (4 square miles, 21,188 buildings). Only Japan
itself [in] 1923 at Tokyo and Yokohama, had suffered so terrible a
disaster. No other air attack of the war, either in Japan or Europe, was
so destructive of life and property (Craven and Cate, 1948-53. vol. 5,
617).
The 1923 fire was used as a model for planning the attack. Like other great fires in
Tokyo’s past, it showed the vulnerability of low-lying and residential areas, and the
importance of windy months in historical conflagrations, especially March and
September. The objective was, indeed, to recreate a calamity.18

17
18

USBS P Files #12 and #56.
HO 191/194, RED; REN, 424.
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“Big Fire” was the worst attack, but others caused severe damage. A fire set
by the night raid of 25th-26th May was even larger; the largest in the history of
warfare. Less congested districts and the mass exodus after “Big Fire” meant fewer
casualties, but 3,400 deaths in one night exceeded anything in London or Berlin.
Another raid burnt out almost as much as “Big Fire”. A fourth, with 23.4 km2, was
similar to the Hamburg firestorm, the worst in Germany, and another exceeded the
Dresden firestorm (Hewitt, 1993).19
An American serviceman, writing in September 1945, echoed his countryman in
Berlin:
... Tokyo, the first war casualty I've seen is a devastated, immodest
mess, but the silence is what gets me most; no honks, yells, clangs none of the stuff you hate about a town but come to expect. For Tokyo,
for all Japan I suppose, the calamity is past, but everyone is still staring
in that god-awful silence (Cary, 1975, 54).
Bombing was not the only reason for the numbed state of so many Japanese.
However, the bombed wastelands of the capital, described as “dead city” or “lunar
landscapes” (USSBS, 1947a), were constant reminders of their ruined world.
(In)decisive Blows?
A fateful notion linking strategic air power to the plight of these capital cities
was of the “knock-out blow” (Quester, 1966; MacIsaac, 1986).20 Then, as now, a
pessimistic view of defence against air attack prevailed among the airmen,
encouraging attacks as sudden and “total” as possible to avoid retaliation in kind.
For a time, in 1940-41, the Luftwaffe claimed it would cripple Britain or keep her
out of the war by delivering the heaviest possible blows on London. The great RAF
attacks on Berlin and USAAF fire raids on Tokyo were justified in similar terms.
Raid reports for air crew and the public emphasised vital communications,
government buildings, state-institutions, key installations. In fact, the central,
congested areas aimed at and destroyed contained few or no essential or more
modern war industries. An impression was given of damage primarily to industries,
yet items vital to the war were rarely hit or, like the railways, got going quickly;
essential war workers were a small fraction of the casualties. In all three capitals
the production “must” for weapons and war supplies was maintained almost to the
last.21

19

USBS P file # 56.
USBS E 193a; HO 192/1645; AIR14/763, 1779; AIR 20/4054, 4069.
21
AIR 14/1229, 20/3234; AIR 20/4831 B, Ops. 1, 15th February.
20
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There is, then, in the plans of strategic bombing, a sense of gross
oversimplification of the relation between the capitals, especially their citizens’
“morale”, and a war effort. On economic warfare, Milward (1977, 298) finds the
tendency was “... to believe what they wanted to believe ...” A lack of any clear
impact on the course of the war by these capital city calamities challenges how
urban realities were understood in bombing theory, and aggravates the sense of
unnecessary suffering inflicted on non-combatants.
The Big Blitz may have been less destructive than the worst-case predictions,
but surely a serious test of the ‘knock-out blow’ thesis. No capital of a major
power, no urban population, had endured such a weight and repetition of attack. If
the air power theorists had been even partly right, Britain’s will or means to wage
war should have suffered measurably. The opposite seems nearer the truth. The
enormous civil destruction, unimaginable pain and personal loss for so many folk,
and irrecoverable loss of cultural heritage never translated into great harm to the
war effort. The real damage was not only largely confined to and borne by
civilians, but they emerged more committed to the war than before (Calder, 1969).
Despite vastly greater devastation, the Battle of Berlin also brought no
serious change in the capital's war role. Neither bomb damage, labour shortage, nor
demoralisation prevented munitions and other vital production from continuing to
rise (Speer, 1970; Milward 1977, chapter 9)22. It did not “cost Germany the war”
and yet, amazingly, the same belief soon resurfaced in a plan called Operation
THUNDERCLAP. Although not carried out as such, its documents provide a clear
statement of knock-out blow thinking, its urbicidal nature and the intent to cause
civil disasters (Webster and Frankland, 1961, v.1V, 54).
It was proposed that “... an all-out attack by every means at our disposal on
German civilian morale might be decisive”23. A carpet of 2,000 tons of bombs per
square mile was envisaged for central Berlin, or between 10,000 and 20,000 tons of
bombs, “... something out of the ordinary ...”! This was to “... cause 90%
devastation [such that]…3/4 of the people…in this area will become casualties.
Assuming a daytime population of 300,000 [in the central 2 mi2], it may be
expected that 220,000 casualties will be caused. 50% of these, or 110,000 may be
expected to be killed ...” Moreover, being “... for purely moral effect”:
... i) the attack must be delivered in such density that it imposes as
nearly as possible 100% risk of death to the individual in the area...
iii) The target chosen should be one involving the maximum
associations, both traditional and personal, for the population as a

22
23

USBS E, 39 b 1-14; USBS.E #2, 2a, 3 and 3
AIR 14/838, vol. 3, 52.
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whole. Considerations of economic importance must not be permitted
to influence the selection of the target.
iv) subject to iii), the area selected should embrace the highest density
of population ...”24 (emphases added).
Equally relevant, the model for this annihilating blow on Berlin was developed by
identifying what would do the same to London! THUNDERCLAP documents
contain a raid plan to destroy London. (Since breaches of secrecy occur most often
within the intelligence apparatus itself, it was perhaps fortunate the German Air
Force no longer had the capacity to raid London!)
The February 3rd, 1945, USAAF attack almost achieved the intensity
THUNDERCLAP prescribed and something approaching the devastation. A mass
exodus meant casualties were much less. Thereafter, Berlin was finally “written
off” as an urban target. Yet, Germany’s leaders remained in the capital to direct the
war to the very end. “Uniquely devastated” as it was, Allied troops had to take the
city street by street in some of the bloodiest fighting of the war.
“Big Fire” achieved or exceeded every ingredient expected of a knock-out
blow. Strategic air power struck the “heart” of the enemy state long before an
invasion was possible. Tokyo burned as Berlin would not and suffered unparalleled
destruction. Civilian casualties, “de-housing” and panic-like uprooting exceeded
the worst pre-war visions. Civilian survivors saw imminent death threatening
everyone in the burning districts (Guillian, 1947; Pacific War Research Society,
1972).
General LeMay, commander of U.S.A.A.F units, regarded the raid as the
most ‘successful’ of the war, causing more casualties than any other military action
(Coffey, 1987). He did not mention that they were nearly all civilians; two-thirds
women and children (Selden, 2008). Yet, there was no discernable break in the
Japanese will to fight, or in civilian support. On March 10th, a great military parade
took place in Tokyo, ignoring the thousands of families streaming out of the city
(Havens, 1978, 178). The American airmen themselves did not pause to let the
message sink in, but hurried to fire bomb nearly every other Japanese city (Hewitt,
1997, 306)
It should be emphasised that raid planning did not ignore, let alone spare,
other cities. The assault on the capitals is a special threat and narrative of air power
in relation to cities. However, residents of other heavily bombed cities faced the
same or similar and sometimes more calamitous threats. There was even a kind of
generalised knock-out-blow thinking. The Big Blitz turned into an attack on all

24

AIR 14/838, “10,000 Plan”,

Proving Grounds of Urbicide

362

major industrial cities (Wakefield, 1990). RAF Bomber Command pursued shifting
notions of just how many German cities, and down to what minimum size, would
have to be flattened to win the war (Webster and Frankland, 1961). The
Superfortresses attacked almost all large and medium-sized Japanese cities.
The Social Geography of Disaster
If the bombing is commonly described as ‘indiscriminate’, raids were quite
‘discriminatory’ in social and urban terms. Who lived and who died, whose homes
were razed and whose survived, followed mainly from the social geography of
density and wealth, much as in so-called natural disasters (Hewitt, 2007). However,
raid planning was designed to exploit the most vulnerable areas. Over an area of
many city blocks the fall of bombs was essentially random. The denser the
buildings, the more likely free-falling, widely scattered bombs would hit them or,
most important, start a fire whose flames would spread to other buildings. Fires
caused most property damage and served as beacons guiding the further bombing.25
London consisted of 96 boroughs. Some of the outer, suburban boroughs lost
barely a dozen homes in total, their civilian casualties measured in single figures.
By contrast, each of 26 inner boroughs had over 400 civilian air raid deaths
(Hewitt, 1994b). Only three British cities, Liverpool, Birmingham and Glasgow,
with populations three to four times larger, lost more residents than the inner
boroughs of Lambeth (1,470 killed) and Wandsworth (1,253).26 Property damage,
especially housing, was concentrated in historic core areas and dense East End
boroughs along the river.27 Yet, more bombs actually fell over the extensive, outer
boroughs, reflecting how the fraction of ground space covered in buildings was
critical. Aldgate had 69 percent roofed-over area, Ealing or Finchley further out,
had 12 percent; the whole of Greater London barely 5 percent.
The V-weapon strikes were virtually random within broad, tens-of-kilometers
wide pathways. Nevertheless, their net impact was concentrated in densely
inhabited areas of southern and central London boroughs, including over 40
percent of housing losses. In Fulham, Deptford, Camberwell, and Wandsworth
deaths approached those of the Big Blitz (Collier, 1957).
Equally telling are exact places of death. As early as October 1940, more
people were dying in their homes than anywhere else. Air raid shelter deaths came
second. Deaths at work or in the streets were negligible. In a mid-April, 1941, raid
in S.E. London, 18 percent died in shelters and 70 percent in their homes, mainly in
row-houses, the most frequently hit buildings.28 However, a marked increase in
25

HO 191/9, 198/244, 199/284, AIR 14/1779.
PRO/HO 191/9.
27
HO 193/13; HO 193/45; HO 198/244.
28
HO 191, Bradford Hill’s notes R.E.N # 441 p.2.
26
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tuberculosis between 1939 and 1941 was related to nights in damp, cold shelters; a
greater risk, some thought, than the bombs. No wonder people preferred to stay at
home, their numbers increasing through the Big Blitz.
There were significant age and gender differences. The highest proportionate
death toll in the Big Blitz and in many German cities was among the elderly,
tending to increase with age. “Shelter deaths of the aged” were widely reported,
involving heart attacks and other stress- or privation-related causes—a kind of
involuntary euthanasia (USSBS, E, 1945c). The highest numbers of casualties in
homes and shelters were women, along with relatively more child deaths. In the
denser County of London districts, more females were killed than males (CWRC,
1954).
Where names, addresses and dates are available they reveal multiple deaths
in single households (CWRC, 1954), mainly at home but also in air raid shelters
and, above all, in the “disaster” raids hitting row houses or tenement blocks, or
large air raid shelters (Marwick, 1976).29 Multiple deaths in particular families took
more children, females and elderly (Hewitt, 1994b). Since mobilisation for war was
at an early stage in the Big Blitz, more men were present. The V-weapon attacks,
later in the war, caused proportionately higher female and child deaths. When the
bombing was greatest over Berlin and Tokyo, mobilisation was far more complete
and casualty figures reflect the greater presence of “non-essential personnel”.
Meanwhile, researchers at Britain’s Ministry of Home Security had decided that
losing a home was even more distressing for British civilians than deaths. I doubt
this, but it led RAF planning to give priority to de-housing German people,
intensifying impacts on resident civilians.
Berlin was divided into twenty Districts (Bezirken). Damage was
concentrated in the more densely packed residential areas. In the central built-up
areas, 31 percent of housing was destroyed, compared to 4 percent in the outer
suburbs (Foreign Office and MEW, 1944, 8). Civilian casualties were heaviest in
Kreuzberg (1,697 killed), Charlottenburg (1,621) and Mitte (1,463). After the
Battle of Berlin, visible damage was greatest in the inner city. Casualties and
property loss were concentrated here, mainly among older, more congested
buildings.30
The geography of demolition also highlights the role of “disaster” attacks.
Half of Steglitz’ casualties occurred on 23/24 August, 1943: 57 percent of the
bombed out, and two-thirds of building damage; Steglitz’ “catastrophe.” Then
again, some residents were killed in thirty-two other attacks (Hampe and Mauter,

29
30

HO 191/60; USBS E, 1 File 152
HO 193/13, 45; USSBS #E 39
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1982).31 It is a reminder that, for most of the war, raiding was so arduous, and
navigation errors and disruption by the defences so severe, that there were huge
uncertainties in when and whether even high density areas would suffer.
Tokyo comprised fifteen “Old” and twenty “New” Wards, the low-lying and
most densely inhabited ones suffering over 90 percent of civilian deaths (Sherry,
1987; Edoin, 1987). Districts completely razed in the 9th-10th March conflagration
formed 7 percent of the city’s area but housed over a quarter of its population.
Almost total annihilation of the inner wards explains their phenomenal population
loss. The most populous, Honjo, with 241,000 residents in 1944, fell by 95 percent;
Fukugawa and Asakusa by 93 and 89.5 percent respectively. Old City wards fell to
a quarter of their 1944 population, or a fifth of 1940. Some outer, New Wards lost
half their pre-raid population, if proportionately fewer killed. Arakawa, the most
populous ward, lost over 250,000 folk, the largest in total numbers and 75 percent
of its pre-raid residents (USSBS P, 1947b).
“Low City” Disasters
In the capitals, as other large cities, people spoke of the attacks as “slum
raids.” Official reports identified the greatest losses in London with “crowded
terraces and courts”, “mean, narrow streets”, “back-to-back’ and “congested
Nineteenth century housing”; “... house property of slum, or semi-slum [sic!]
character and shoddily built”.32
In Berlin, apartments suffered twice the losses of other dwellings, mainly in
working-class areas. A Japanese journalist recalled how “(o)ne night ... 100,000
people were killed when they hit a slum area [presumably “Big Fire” raid] ...”, and
added, “If the raid had come in a ‘better’ section of town, the victims would have
been able to spread more concern ...”.33
Writing about old Tokyo, Edward Seidensticker (1983, viii) distinguishes
between, “... what occurred in the city because it was a capital, and what occurred
because it was a city ...” He explores how capital and city are intertwined, but
unequally. The greatest bombing losses occurred in the Shitamachi, which he calls
Tokyo’s Low City or plebaeian flatlands—socially, as well topographically, “low”.
Here the great fire raids sought to hurt “the capital,” to bring about a strategic
“decapitation” of the state, on the dubious assumption that ordinary city-folk and
their living space had leverage against the “high city.” Instead, the latter’s very
survival had come to require and accept sacrificing the former!
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In each capital, wartime conditions also exaggerated losses among those
subject to social disadvantage in peacetime (Hewitt, 1994a). There were many
more women alone and woman-headed households. Battlefront casualties were
disproportionate among men from densely populated inner city areas, leaving many
more widowed or, de facto, “single-parent” households. Relatively, there were
more elderly folk, unemployed youths, children and disabled needing care.
Anecdotal evidence suggests care givers, in most cases women, were put at greater
risk. Popular accounts have emphasised women engaged in war work, the “Rosie
the Rivetters” or “land army girls” (Gluck, 1987), but far more women and female
bombing victims were “homemakers”.
Equally important from a civil perspective, many older and more vulnerable
neighbourhoods had resembled collections of ‘urban villages’, each with its special
flavour and history, and a long-time resident population (Stern, 1947; Havens,
1978; Hostettler, 1990). Their inhabitants surely wanted a better life, better
conditions, but still valued the places where their lives were actually set. Such
matters were irrelevant to raid planning, but not to residents at the sharp end of
urbicidal warfare. Those who survived would mourn those lost places (Hewitt,
1983, 276-77; Nipper and Nutz, 1993).
Interpretations: Urbicidal Dreams and Realities
Over time, much like the war itself, these metropolitan calamities moved and
expanded successively from England to Germany and then Japan. Impacts in each
capital differed because the types of munitions used and the scale of attack
changed. In London and Berlin most injuries and deaths were due to high explosive
bombs and fragmentation devices, although fire caused most property damage
(Zuckerman, 1978). In Tokyo, like most other Japanese and German cities,
incendiaries killed more people and fire-related losses exceeded all others (Hewitt,
1997, chapter11). Londoners and Berliners endured almost six years of raid-related
stresses and privations, including life in bomb-damaged homes and neighourhoods.
Conversely, Tokyo was annihilated in short order, but spared the years of raid
threats and rubble, though not other and severe wartime privations (Havens, 1978).
In many respects, however, there were fundamental similarities between the
impacts of bombing on civilians in each city.
The ingredients of Urbicide
First and foremost, the raids destroyed the life support of urban communities.
For each city they defined a negative urban, civil ecology distinguished by:
1) fatalities concentrated among resident civilians;
2) a predominance of casualties among “definitive civilians”: women,
children, the elderly and infirm, and persons who were not just non-
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combatants but mainly involved in continuance of, and dependence on,
civil life;
3) attacks on the domestic foundations of the city, through physical
damage predominantly to homes, the ‘de-housing’ of residents, and
death and injuries mainly occurring in homes and civilian air raid
shelters;
4) enforced displacement of resident populations, directly for the
bombed-out, indirectly through official evacuations that separated and
dispersed families and neighbours, dismembering their shared worlds;
5) physical destruction to civil support systems and urban institutions;
shops, schools, hospitals, places of entertainment and worship; these
institutions were subjected to the second-greatest level of destruction,
after housing;
6) extensive, indiscriminate but often intentional destruction of
buildings of historic and artistic significance, ancient landmarks,
symbols of identity and continuity of urban settlements;
7) indiscriminate, wall-to-wall destruction of the inner city, the
capitals’ historic site and urban heritage; exploiting the vulnerability of
its social and civic geography, hoping to influence war functions or
political power;
8) generating landscapes of violence whose rubble and dead buried
under it converted the living city into a necropolis.
For a geographer, such a profile of harm amounts to “place annihilation”, the
extermination of lived geographies (Hewitt, 1983). It underscores the murder and
displacement of the place-makers and, in wartime, place-maintainers of cities, as
well as the razing of built environments and urban heritage. Added to this, socalled civil defence failed when needed the most. The often heroic efforts of
firemen, first-aid units and others could not reverse the failure to invest adequately
in civil defence, or remotely as much as in the bomber fleets.
Similar concerns underpin the notion of urbicide, but identify something
beyond destructive outcomes: intentional gross violation of human rights or crimes
of war. The once-secret raid plans like THUNDERCLAP show the profile of
“place annihilation” outlined above was an intended, not accidental, achievement.
It gives the lie to the propaganda of reprisals and ‘collateral damage’. The countercity raids described here were intended to terrorise civilians, the losses largely paid
by them during and after the war. If anything is urbicide, the attacks on the capitals
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were. However, so were attacks on hundreds of other cities in the Second World
War.
Discussions of urbicide tend to focus on profound changes in the nature of
wars and warfare since 1945, and also in urbanism and urban living (Graham,
2004). From certain perspectives it is hard to disagree, but not so clearly from that
of bombed civilians. Air raid casualties have continued to be overwhelmingly
civilian, from the Korean War to Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza and Georgia
today. Air power has remained essentially a state instrument for dominant powers
who lead in the manufacture, sale and use of air weapons, mainly the world war
victors or their clients. In particular, two key features argue continuity more than
change: the condition of civilians in bombed cities, and the mind-set and intentions
of counter-city bombing.
Concluding remarks
On the one hand, even if it was sixty years ago, the study and remembrance
of what happened in bombed capitals seems to me justified in its own right, as
other great calamities; not least to do justice to the collective memories of erstwhile
“enemies” (Irwin-Zarecka, 1994). The neglect of comparative study, surely a major
concern of geographers and historians; the implications of such widely championed
and praised brutality; the suffering of so many innocent and defenceless persons on
all sides; all seem compelling reasons to look back. On the other hand, as the title
suggests, key elements of those campaigns appear as ‘proving grounds’ for what
bombing did to other cities in the world war and would continue to do to the
present time, including capitals like Baghdad, Kabul, Grozny, and Beirut.
What the bombing revealed at once in London, later in Berlin and Tokyo,
was a remarkable disarticulation between the capital as such, or its war functions,
and the plight of its citizens. Matters crucial to the war effort were a good deal
more defensible or moveable than densely built-up areas and civil populations. The
capitals’ authority was, seemingly, more abstract than concrete; more like the
thermostat than the power-house of war. The results strongly support the view that
these attacks “... hit what was physically the most vulnerable but socially the least
effective component of the city ...” (Sherry, 1987, 286). Scattered through Allied
raid planning documents are references to the voiceless condition of the German
and Japanese people. Some urged bombing Government headquarters or Party
apparatus, if the focus could not be on factories, power plants, and transportation.
The balance of air force and technical opinion favoured indiscriminate annihilation
of densely-packed inner districts.34 Yet, even had they substantially influenced the
course of the world war, reduced its length and overall casualties, could the attacks
on capital cities and all the other urban area raids be justified? What does it mean to
34
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not merely condone but aim to kill defenceless civilians to save soldiers’ lives or
influence enemy soldiers and leaders? To destroy the major, essentially
defenceless, centres of civilised life to reduce the toll of air, sea and ground battles?
In the world war a basic difference emerged, material as well as moral,
between the urban attacks as a civilian threat and supposed air power goals. Yet, if
the capitals seemed to offer unique opportunities for air power, limited strategic
results never led to a reduction, let alone rejection, of this style of raiding. This also
applies to counter-city raiding from Korea to Afghanistan; dubious results, but a
refusal to stop experimenting.
More alarming, perhaps, is the absence of any effective or concerted effort to
defend and promote civil priorities against this fundamental threat to civil life.
Rather, bombing has escalated, even to serve, supposedly, progressive values:
“humanitarian wars” or to “bring democracy”! Meanwhile, the nature and
prevalence of civilian losses are identical to the world war bombings (Hewitt,
1997; Ali, 2000).
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